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CORPORATIONS-SEcuRITIEs ACT OF 1933-LIABILITY FOR MISSTATEMENTS
AND NoNDIsCLOSU1ES UNDER SECTION 11-Escott v. BarChris Construction Cor-
poration, 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)-On March 30. 1961 BarChris Con-
struction Corporation, a New York corporation engaged since 1946 in the construc-
tion and operation of bowling alleys, filed a registration statement with the Securities
and Exchange Commission for a proposed sale of 5 per cent convertible sub-
ordinated fifteen year debentures. Amendments to the statement were filed on
May 11 and May 16, and the statement became effective on the later date. On
May 24, BarChris received the proceeds of the sale of the debentures, $3,302,298.65.
As the bowling alley construction boom declined, BarChris found itself in increas-
ingly poor financial condition. On October 29, 1962, it filed a petition in bank-
ruptcy. Interest on the debentures on November 1, 1962 was not paid. On Oc-
tober 25, 1962, holders of the debentures brought an action under Section 11 of
the Securities Act of 19331 against the Corporation, the signers of the registration
statement, the underwriters of the bond issue, and Pete, Marwick, Mitchell, and Co.,
BarChris' auditor, claiming that the statement contained false statements and ma-
terial omissions.
District court Judge McLean found overstatements of sales, earnings, assets, and
orders backlog, understatements of contingent liabilities and failures to make ade-
quate disclosure with regard to officers' loans, use of proceeds from the debentures,
customers delinquencies and operations of bowling alleys.2 He then held that all
the statements relating to the affairs of 1961 contained material misstatements and
omissions as did some from earlier years.a
Turning then to an examination of the "due diligence" defense of each defend-
ant, Judge McLean found that no defendant maintained the burden necessary to
show due diligence. The defense is established by a showing by the defendant:
[Als regards any part of the registration statement not purporting to be
made on the authority of an expert . . . he had, after reasonable investi-
gation, reasonable grounds to believe and did believe, at the time such part
of the registration statement became effective, that the statements therein
were true and that there was no omission to state a material fact required
to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements therein not mis-
leading....4
1 15 U.S.C. §77k (1964).
2 Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). A ful sum-
mary of the various falsities and omissions appears in the opinion on page 679. McLean found
that 1960 sales were overstated by $653,900 and 1960 net operating income by $246,605.
The 1960 Balance Sheet showed a $609,689 overstatement of assets. Sales and profits for the
quarter ending March 31, 1961 were overstated by $519,810 and $230,755, respectively. Con-
tingent liabilities were understated by $375,795 as of December 31, 1960, and $618,853 as of
April 30, 1961. Moreover, $325,000 of contingent liabilities as of December 31, 1960 and
$314,166 as of April 30, 1961 should have been shown as direct liabilities. Failure to disclose
included $386,615 of outstanding officer's loans, $1,160,000 use of proceeds not shown in the
prospectus, over $1,350,000 potential liabilities due to customers' delinquencies and the fact
that BarChris was already engaged and was about to become more heavily engaged in the oper-
ation of bowling alleys.
3 The test for materiality is defined in the regulations of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission, 17 C.F.R. 230.405 (1):
'The -term "material," when used to qualify a requirement for the furnishing of in-
formation as to any subject, limits the information required to those matters as to which
an average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed before purchasing the se-
curity registered."
4 15 U.S.C. §77k(b)(3) (1964).
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Each defendant was found either not to have had a reasonable belief that the regis-
tration statement was true or not to have made such a reasonable investigation so
as to have a ground to believe it was true, or both. The defendants included of-
ficers involved in the daily operations of the firm, house counsel to the firm, so-
called "outside" directors, the lawyer who prepared the statement (also a direc-
tor), the underwriters of the issue and the auditor.
As originally enacted, the Securities Act of 1933 exacted the standard of care
of a signer of a registration statement to be that of "a person occupying a fiduciary
relationship." 5 The Senate suggested an even more rigid standard before the pas-
sage of the bill that became the Act - it was proposed that the directors be made
insurers or guarantors of the truth or accuracy of the statement.6 For the express
purpose of clarifying and removing any uncertainties as to the standard,
7 it was
changed to that of "a prudent man in the management of his own property."s The
final standard was the same as that employed in the English Companies Act.9
This history of Section 11 does little to clarity the intention of Congress as to
just what was to be expected of signers before they affixed their signatures to regis-
tration statements in order that they might assert due diligence if the statement
proved to be false and misleading. As Judge McLean stated in his opinion, -[s]ur-
prisingly enough, there is little or no judicial authority on this question [of what
is necessary to sustain the burden of proving due diligence]." 10
The English Companies Act, a dose parallel to the Securities Act of 1933, con-
tains the same provisions for determining the liabilities and defenses available to
directors.'1 However, the English courts had evolved the standard that directors,
in discharging their duties when signing registration statements, could rely on in-
formation from clerks and other such competent persons'2 but not the state-
ments of promotors or other directors.' 3 The English constructions, therefore,
point to the conclusion that reliance on statements made by those who were in a
position to know and understand the daily operations of the enterprise was suffi-
cient to absolve the director of responsibility when those statements proved to be
false. Eve, J. in the Thrift case sets forth this discussion: 14
Counsel for one of the defendants contended that the arguments ad-
vanced on the behalf of the plaintiff involved this consequence, that no
director could discharge the onus of proving he had reasonable ground for
believing a statement to be true without showing that he had separate
advice from his own lawyer [and] his own accountant .. . . I do not
agree. In my opinion the existance of reasonable grounds for believe in
the truth of any statement is established by the proof of any facts or cir-
cumstances which would induce the belief in the mind of a reasonable
man.., who stands midway between the careless.., man and the over-
cautious and straw-splitting man ....
Judge McLean, on the other hand, has held that corporate directors can not
53 L Loss, SEcurmITs REGULATIONS 1731 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter dted as 3 Loss].
6 HR. REP. No. 152, 73d Con&, 1st Sess. 26 (1933).
7H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Con&, 2d Sess. 41 (1934).
8 15 U.S.C. §77k(c) (1964).
9 3 Loss, supra note 5, at 1726.
10Escott v. BarChris Construction Corporation, 283 F. Supp. 643,683 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
11 19 & 20 Geo. 5, c23, & 37 (Halsbury 1929).
1 2 Stevens v. Hoare, 20 T.LR. 407, 409 (Ch. 1904).
Is Adams v. Thrift, [1915] 1 Ch. 557, aft'd [1915] 2 Ch. 21 (Ct. App.)
'4 Id. at 565.
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rely on the statements of corporate management to establish their due diligence
defenses. Particularly is this shown in the case of Auslander, an outsider who had
become a director on April 17, 1961, virtually the eve of the filing. He relied
on the assurances of management that the prospectus was correct. The Judge
stated:15
He is presumed to know his responsibility when he becomes a director.
He can escape liability only by using that reasonable care to investigate the
facts which a prudent man would employ in the management of his own
property.
Rose, another outside director was also found not to have established due diligence.
"He believed that the registration statement was true. His only basis for his belief
was his reliance upon Peat, Marwick, and upon the BarChris officers."' 6
This case, therefore, holds directors to a higher standard than the English
cases. They are responsible for conducting their own investigations into primary
material - they can not merely investigate by questioning management.
An examination of the aims and purposes of Section 11 and the entire Securi-
ties Act of 1933 is necessitated by the holding, in light of the seemingly strict
interpretation of the language by District Judge McLean. In the midst of the
economic disorganization of the Thirties, Congress enacted the Securities Act of
1933. The stock market had collapsed and securities in the hands of a myriad of
investors were worthless. However, the Act was not designed as a panacea for an
unstable securities atmosphere; there was nothing in the Act that could control the
speculation fever that had seized the American investors in the Twenties, nor
would unsound capital structures be prevented by the Act.' 7 The Act was designed
to require the truth about securities at the time of issue and "to impose a penalty
for failure to tell the truth. Once it is told, the matter is left to the investor."' s
It is not the object of the Act simply to provide a legal remedy for the
investor who has bought securities upon a false representation, to compen-
sate him for a loss incurred. Even the provisions for civil liability are
calculated to be largely preventive rather than redressive.... [EBven this
purpose of securing preventive vigilance and caution on the part of the
persons concerned is only coordinate with, or probably subordinate to, an-
other object. The Act seeks not only to secure accuracy in the informa-
tion that is volunteered to investors, but also, and perhaps more especially,
to compel the disclosure of significant matters which were heretofore
rarely, if ever, disclosed.19
The effects of the Act were to be the prevention of fraudulent transactions and
the placing in the market of a body of facts that would make wise investing more
of an science.2 0
The civil liabilities of the Act, particularly as set forth in Section 11, repre-
sented a change from the concepts of the common law of corporations. In general
the Act reaffirms the duties of certain classes of persons to be responsible for the
15 Escort v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
16 Id. at 689.
17 William 0. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE
L. J. 171 (1933) [hereinafter cited as Douglas).
18 Id.
'9 Harry Shulman, Civil Liability and the Securities Act, 43 YALE L J. 227 (1933) [here-
inafter cited as Shulman].
2o Douglas, supra note 17, at 172.
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assertions in a registration statement.21 The Act, however, extended those duties. It
denies the defense available at common law that the director was under no duty to
the securities purchaser due to a lack of privity between them, other than a duty not
to act so as to defraud.22 The traditional common law concept of scienter is re-
placed by notions of insufficient search and unreasonable grounds for belief.23 In
another departure from the common law the Act required that the defendant bear
the burden of proving the reasonableness of the search.24 The penalties purposely
were made stringent to guarantee that they would provide sufficient impetus to as-
sure full disclosure.25
But despite the high purpose and noble aims of the Act, there has not been a
sizeable amount of litigation under Section 11, primarily because of three factors:
(1) litigation in the United States today is simply too expensive; the average investor
feels that he would simply be throwing good money after bad when he is faced
with the fact that, due to misleading information, a security he holds becomes
worthless; (2) the discovery and proof of materially misleading or untrue state-
ments is too difficult; and (3) the liability of the statement signers is not abso-
lute.20
The shift in the burden of proof accomplished by Section 11 forced the defend-
ants in BarChris27 affirmatively to show their due diligence, rather than sitting by
passively while the plaintiffs attempted to show the signers were not diligent. The
advantage to a plaintiff under Section 11 is obvious.
[T~he requisite that the defendants named in Section 11 prove reasonable
investigation, reasonable grounds for belief, and belief is nothing more than
the application of the general principle that he who has knowledge, or
the means of acquiring knowledge of a particular fact should bear the
burden of coming forward with the evidence after the other party has
advanced his case to the proper point to require such evidence.28
District Judge McLean was well within the ultimate aims of Section 11 in
his holding in BarChris.29 The information contained in the statement was false;
the philosophy and language of Section 11 require it to be true. The signers did
not establish due diligence; the burden to do so is dearly theirs. District Judge
McLean's opinion consists primarily of the finding of facts, rather than an extended
discussion of the legal problems inherent in defining due diligence. Faced with
what was, for all practical purposes, a case of first impression, he had only the
statute to apply to the facts presented to him at trial. These facts were not, for the
most part, such that would make out a dose case; rather, they formed a picture of a
corporation that was in serious trouble and desperate for funds. The result was a
registration statement that contained not just a few errors but gross misstatements
and omissions that provided the potential investor with a picture of that corporation
21 Harry A. Teass, Duties of Directors and Others As Prescribed by Section 11 of the
Securities Act of 1933, 20 VA. L REV. 817 (1934) [hereinafter cited as Teassj.
2 Shulman, supra note 19, at 252.
23 Id. at 248. See also, Douglas, supra note 17, at 174.
24 Id. at 249.
2 5 Douglas, supra note 19, at 173.
26 Shulman, supra note 19, at 251.
27 Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp, 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
2STeass, supra note 21, at 844.
29 Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). His deci-
sion will stand for the time being. Correspondence with the parties revealed that there will
be no appeal.
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which would warrant a paraphrase of the familiar fiction disclaimer: any resem-
blance between this statement and the corporation it is supposed to describe is
purely coincidental.
Given the factual situation he was faced with, District Judge McLean was
fully justified in his findings of no due diligence on the part of the officers of the
corporation. Perhaps the outside directors, Rose and Auslander, were caught in a
trap the existance of which was unknown to them, but they signed the statement
and the law holds them liable for their actions. Their unfamiliarity with the
operations of BarChris Construction might have served to put them on notice that
they should go beyond the assurances of the officers before affixing their signa-
tures. Doing so without further inquiry is evidence that they did not act as pru-
dent men would in the management of their own property. Harsh as the opinion
may seem on brief examination, when the purposes of the Act are taken into ac-
count, its necessity becomes evident.
The effect of the decision on future Section 11 cases remains to be seen. As
stated above this case was made up of "bad" facts and perhaps should be limited
to them. If the case serves the purpose of placing those involved on notice that
Section 11 still exists and encourages better practices in the issuance of securities,
it will have performed a noble task.
The question of the effect of the decision upon the institution of the outside
director remains. It is the author's opinion that this aspect is of great importance
to the legal profession as a whole, for while there are relatively few specialists in
the filing of registration statements with the S.E.C., many attorneys are in the
positions of being outside directors or counsel to outside directors.
Early commentators on the Act and Section 11 were concerned with its effects
on directors, though their views were varied. (Following the initial reaction to the
new law there were virtually no commentators on Section 11.) It was recognized on
the one hand that the risks to directors were greatly increased by the Act and Sec-
tion 11, and that, while some directors were merely on the board to draw prestige
and fees,
[T]here are a great many, particularly of the larger and more complicated
enterprises, who do [direct] and yet are not personally familiar with all
details of operation. Nor could their services be obtained in most cases
if they were required to investigate details of the enterprise. 0
A second view was that little or no effect on directors would result from the pas-
sage of the Act, and the directors would fully accept Section 11, for they would
soon realize "that if they have made a 'reasonable investigation,' have 'reasonable
grounds to believe' and 'believe' they will not be liable under Section 11."31 The
third view was that, while a burden would be placed on "the institution of inac-
tive or dummy directors," the director who was active in the operation of the enter-
prise would realize that all that was required was "reasonable diligence in the
performance of work which involves risk of loss to others," and these directors
would not balk at retaining their positions under the Act.32
It has long been the practice of American corporations to look beyond man-
agement for the outside director. 33 The purpose of a board of directors is often
30 Douglas, supra note 17, at 195 [foomotes omitted].
31 Teass, supra note 21, at 851.
3 2 Shulman, supra note 19, at 253.
3 3M. FumBR, PmESONAL LIABILITIEs OF CoRPoAT OFFICERS AND DmEcroRs 11 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as FEuBRI.
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best served when it collects for the benefit of management a group of outsiders
who are skilled in areas not available to management. "The presence on the board
of experts skilled in allied fields can be, at times, of inestimable value."3 4  A
man may chose to become an outside member of a board for several reasons. He
may seek to broaden his own development as an executive by applying his abilities
to finding solutions in a variety of corporate situations. Association with a broader
list of industrial and community leaders and enhancement of prestige may also
serve as factors in his choice. The opportunity to perform a quasi-public service,
meet new challenges and undergo new experiences also may prove appealing.3 5
Outside directors are rarely expected to be in a position to make decisions based
on direct knowledge of business operations; rather they should provide impartial
and sound balance to the board.38 A roster of suggested sources of outside di-
rectors includes lawyers, bankers, engineers, and public relations experts.37 Men
possessed of particular points of view can be invaluable to the corporation as the
needs for their opinions arise.38
Up until the BarChris30 decision it has been "rather usual for directors to sign
what-ever they're given . . ."40 Books directed at telling directors what their job
was and how to do it have made little reference to "due diligence" in signing regis-
tration statements. Typical is "[djirectors, among others, may be liable for of-
fending registration statements. . . unless they establish good faith and absence of
negligence. [Emphasis added.] 41 The director was to provide acumen in his
particular area and:
No one proposed as a director need hesitate to assume that position be-
cause of any feeling that he is not fitted for it. So long as he makes an
honest effort to do the job . . . he is reasonable sure to be free of lia-
bility ....
The usual procedure to establish any needed due diligence defenses had often
been the "due diligence meeting," held shortly prior to a final issuance of the se-
curities, where those involved could ask questions "which they felt they should ask.
."4 Nobody knew how valuable a safeguard that was. 44
What upsets the financial community about the BarChris decision is that
some of the defendants - found careless by the judge did as much check-
ing as many of their colleagues do in similar situations. 45
34 p. JACKSON, CORPORATEI MANAGEmENT § 52 at 59 (1955) [hereinafter cited as JACK-
soN].
35J. JURAN & J. LOUDEN, THE CoRPORATE DIRECTOR 326 (1966). It is interesting to
note that this book has no corresponding list of reasons not to join a board as an outsider.
36 FEUER, supra note 33, at 22.
3 7 JACKSON, supra note 34, at 51.
381d. at 52.
39 Escort v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
40 Wall Street Journal, May 14, 1968, at 1, Col. S.
4 1 MIV FEUER, HANDBOOK FOR CORPORATE DmECTORS 158 (1965). See also, P. JACK-
SON, WHAT EVERY CORPORATION DIRECTOR SHOULD KNOW 173 (1949).
4 2 FEUER, supra note 33, at 11.
43C. ISRAELS & G. DUFF, JR., WHEN CORPORATIONS Go PUBLIC 155-56 (1962).
443 Loss, supra note 5, at 1731. Professor Loss goes on to warn, "But it seems advisable, in
the present state of the law and in view of the potentially grave liabilities under § 11, to do
something of this sort in a serious manner rather than perfunctorily." His prediction, pub-
lished seven years before BarChris, proved valid.
45 Wall Street Journal, May 14, 1968, at 1, Col. 8.
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Assuming that the outside director is a valuable asset on the board and that, in
light of BarChris,46 much more will be required of him in the way of personal
investigation of a corporation's affairs before he signs a registration statement,
he may not be so willing to offer his services in the future. "The decision will
probably give directors the willies .. .."47 Judge McLean probably has not placed
the standard so high as to frighten off all outside sources of advice and talent, but
there can be no doubt that he has severely limited the field. The outside director
who signs everything he is given does not belong on the board, but many capable
and conscientious men may find, or be advised, that the risk is just too high to
justify the prestige and other rewards that come from being a member of the
board.
Ronald L. Solove
REAL ESTATE-BRoK's CoMMIssIoN-TI ME OF AccRu.--Ellsworth Dobbs,
Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967)-Ellsworth Dobbs, In-
corporated, a real estate broker, brought suit against John and Adelaide Johnson,
sellers of the real estate, and Joseph Iarussi, the prospective purchaser thereof, in
connection with the attempted sale of a farm. The Johnsons listed the property
for sale with Dobbs, and Dobbs procured Iarussi as a purchaser. The Johnsons and
Iarussi entered into a contract of sale, but there was no dosing due to Iarussi's inabil-
ity to obtain financial backing. The broker then initiated the present suit against
both sellers and purchaser seeking his commission. The broker contended that the
sellers had breached an express agreement to pay his commission for bringing about
the contract of sale. Plaintiff also charged the purchaser with breach of an implied
agreement to pay if he failed to complete the purchase and thus deprived the broker
of his commission from the sellers.1 The trial court determined that the contract
between the broker and seller specified no event for the accruing of the broker's
commission, and that therefore, as a matter of law, the broker earned his commis-
sion when the seller indicated his acceptance of the purchaser by executing the con-
tract of sale.2 The trial court then held that it was a jury question as to whether
the purchaser implicitly agreed to perform in the event that plaintiff found suitable
property and a contract of sale was executed. s  The appellate court reversed the
judgment against the sellers, holding that there were sufficient facts under the con-
tract of sale to warrant submitting to the jury the question of whether the broker's
right to the commission had been conditioned, by special agreement, upon the trans-
fer of title.4 The appellate court also reversed the judgment against the purchaser
4 6 Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y.) 1968).
47 Wall Street Journal, May 14, 1968, at 1, Col. 8.
1Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 535, 236 A.2d 843, 846 (1967).
21d. at 535, 236 A.2d at 846. New Jersey cases had held that, in the absence of a special
agreement, an authorized broker is entitled to a commission when he produces a purchaser able
and willing to buy on the seller's terms and the seller enters into a binding contract with the pur-
chaser, even though the purchaser eventually proves to be financially unable to perform. Richard
v. Falled, 13 N.J.Super. 534, 536, 81 A.2d 17, 18 (App. Div. 1951).
3 Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 535, 236, A.2d 843, 846 (1967).
4 Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 92 N.J.Super. 271, 279-80, 223 A.2d 199, 203-04 (App.
Div. 1966). The rule in New Jersey is such that the broker and seller may by special agreement




on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to show either an express or an
implied agreement to perform by the purchaser.5 The Supreme Court of New Jer-
sey reversed and established a new rule concerning the accrual of a real estate
broker's commission: 6
tea - the broker earns his commission when (a) he produces a purchaser
ready, willing and able to buy on the terms fixed by the owner, (b) the
purchaser enters into a binding contract with the owner to do so, and
(c) the purchaser completes the transaction by dosing the title in accord-
ance with the provisions of the contract.7
Unlike this new rule, which delays the accruing of the commission until the
transfer of title, the old rule provided that a broker's commission accrued as soon
as he produced an able and willing purchaser who entered into a contract of sale
on terms authorized by seller.8 The old rule arose from a desire of nineteenth cen-
tury courts to protect brokers from unscrupulous and capricious sellers.9 The broker-
seller relationship is comparable to a situation arising out of a unilateral contract.
The seller is the offeror and the broker is the offeree. An offeror's obligation un-
der a unilateral contract is conditioned upon the completion of the requested per-
formance by the offeree.10 Thus a seller of real estate was not thought to be obli-
gated to pay the broker his commission until the broker sold the land. Courts
feared that at any time before the transfer of title the seller could capriciously termi-
nate the offer and thereby destroy the broker's right to a commission even though
the broker had produced an able and willing purchaser.11
To avoid such conduct by sellers, courts ruled that a broker earned his commis-
sion as soon as he produced an able and willing purchaser and such purchaser en-
ters into a contract of sale on terms authorized by the seller. In cases of purchaser
default, the seller had to nevertheless pay the broker his commission if the sales
contract had been executed since that event shifted the risk of the purchaser's non-
performance to the seller.' 2 Courts rationalized the old rule upon one of two
theories. The first theory was that by executing the sales contract the seller not
5 Id. at 282-83, 223 A.2d at 205.
6 Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967).
7Id. at 551, 236 A.2d at 855.
81d. at 543, 236 A.2d at 850-51; Richard V. Falleti, 13 N.J.Super. 534, 536, 81 A.2d 17,
18 (App. Div. 1951); Alnor Cost. Co. v. Herchet, 10 N.J. 246, 253, 90 A.2d 14, 18 (1952).
Courts stating this rule recognize the fact that the seller must have an opportunity to accept the
purchaser. Richard v. Falleti, 13 N.J.Super. 534, 536, 81 A.2d 17, 18 (App. Div. 1951). One
court has stated that the purchaser obtained need not be able and willing. Freeman v. Van Wag-
enen, 90 N.J.L. 358, 360, 101 A. 55, 56 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
9 See Hinds v. Henry, 36 N.J.L. 328, 332 (1873) (Seller cannot arbitrarily defeat broker's
right to commission after broker has produced a purchaser); Rauchwanger v. Katzin, 82 N.J.L.
339, 340-41, 82 A.510 (Sup. Ct. 1912) (Seller cannot deprive broker of the fruits of his la-
bor); Lehrkoff v. Schwartsky, 2 N.J.Misc. 353, 354, 125 A. 496 (Super. Ct. 1924) (Court ex-
presses doubt about seller escaping liability for commission if he capriciously refused to carry
out his contingent contract). See generally Wallace, Effect of Qualifying Listing Language on
Real Estate Broker's Commissions; Obligation of a Listing Property Owner, 1957 WASH. L.Q.
297 [Hereinafter cited as Wallace, Effect of Listing Language).
10 Tartoria v. Manko, 134 Conn. 345, 347, 57 A.2d 493, 494 (1948).
11Sec Kock v. Emmerling, 63 U.S. (22 How.) 69, 74 (1859).
12 Amies v. Wesnofske, 255 N.Y. 156, 167, 174 N.E. 436, 439-40 (1931) (Dissenting
opinion - seller assumes the risk of buyer's nonperformance). cf. Matz v. Bessman, 1 N.J.Misc.
5, 6 (Super. Ct. 1923) (Broker does not insure the buyer). See generally Perrin, What Per-
formance Entitles a Real Estate Broker to Commission - New York Law, 23 YALE L.J. 399,
399-444 (1914).
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only expressly bound himself to sell the property but also implicitly accepted the
financial condition of that purchaser. 13 This "acceptance" of the purchaser estopped
the seller from asserting the purchaser's inability to perform as a defense to the broker's
suit for his commission. The second theory was that the agreement between seller
and broker required only that the broker negotiate a sale.14 According to these
theories the seller, in hiring a broker, does not intend to rely upon the broker's
knowledge of the purchaser's financial position. The seller intends to make his
own investigation of the purchaser's position before signing the sales contract.' 5
In order to darify the broker-seller relationship with respect to real estate, two
points should be made. First, it should be recognized that there is no difference
in legal result between the old rule and the new rule where the seller is the de-
faulting party.16 The distinction between these rules arises only when the pur-
chaser is in default. Second, it should be understood that neither rule is applicable
where, by special agreement, the parties provide otherwise.17 Thus, under the old
rule the parties could have provided by special agreement that the commission would
not accrue until the transfer of title. And, under the new rule, the parties can pro-
vide that the commission accrues upon the execution of the sales contract.' 8
In many ways the old rule, as applied, was unfortunate. That rule might have
been unnecessary to avoid the problem of the unscrupulous seller in the unilateral
contract situation. Courts could have conditioned the broker's right to a commission
upon the transfer of title, yet provided that this condition for accrual would be in-
applicable (and the broker would have an immediate right to his commission) where
the seller failed to perform. 19 In this way the problem of the unscrupulous seller
who would unnecessarily refuse to perform could be solved without moving the
accrual time for the commission up from the transfer of title to the execution of
the sales contract. The old rule was also undesirable because it seems to have run
counter to the actual intentions of the parties. In the broker-seller relationship, the
seller normally intends to become liable to his broker for a commission only upon
the sale of the land. It cannot be said that brokers are unaware of this situation.
So, unless there is a special agreement to the contrary, the realistic expectation is
that the commission will not accrue until there is a transfer of title.20 The old rule,
which declares generally that the commission accrues upon the execution of the sales
contract, seems contrary to the above intention.
Finally, the old rule was unfortunate in its application. It purportedly required
the occurrence of two events before the broker earned his commission: (1) the
broker's presentation of an able and willing purchaser; and (2) the execution of
13 See, e.g., Brindley v. Brook, 10 N.J.Misc. 612, 614, 160 A. 398 (Super. Ct. 1932).
14 See, e.g., Freeman v. Van Wagenen, 90 N.J.L. 358, 360, 101 A. 55, 56 (Sup. Ct. 1917).
15 Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 547-48, 236 A.2d 843, 853 (1967).
16 Id. at 551, 236 A.2d at 855.
17 Id. at 546, 236 A.2d at 852.
Is The court in Ellsworth restricted the broker's ability to make a special contract by declaring
unconscionable any contract containing contrary provisions concerning the accrual of the
broker's commission whenever substantial inequality of bargaining power, position or advantage
exist. Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 555, 236 A.2d 843, 857 (1967).
L9 See Kock v. Emmerling, 63 U.S. 68 (1859); Riggs v. Turnbull, 105 Md. 135, 66 A.13
(1907); But see Coppage v. Howard, 127 Md. 512, 96 A. 642 (1916). See generally Note,
The Implications of a Promise to Buy or Sell into a Real Estate Brokerage Contract: An Analysis
of the Ready Willing and Able Theory, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 380, 384-85 (1966).
2 0 Ellsworth Dodds, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 547, 236 A.2d 843, 852-53 (1967); Den-
nis Reed, Ltd. v. Goody, [1950] 1 All E.R. 919, 923 (K.B.). See Wallace, Effect of Listing
Language, note 9 supra, at 299.
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the contract of sale.2' In reality, however, the execution of the sales contract, alone,
was sufficient to give the broker a right to the commission.m Early courts, being
concerned with defaulting sellers and not defaulting purchasers, gave minimal at-
tention to the consequences of a broker's failure to produce a financially able pur-
chaser. Later courts seemingly failed to recognize this oversight and held the seller
liable for the commission even though the buyer was unable financially to complete
the sales contract.P Thus any significance the word "able" had in connection with
the broker's task in producing a purchaser was eliminated. 24 Sellers often found
themselves at the mercy of unscrupulous brokers who could earn their commission
by simply ". . . tendering a human being who is physically and mentally capable of
agreeing to buy the property . . .so long as the owner enters into a sales contract
with such person." 25
The new rule announced by the court in Ellsworth goes far towards correcting
the above deficiencies in the old rule. This new rule requires the occurrence of
three events before the broker's right to his commission accrues: (1) the procure-
ment of an able and willing purchaser; (2) the execution of a sales contract; and
(3) the transfer of title. Implicit in this new rule is the fact that ". .. if the fail-
ure of completion of the contract results from the wrongful act or interference of
the seller, the broker's claim is valid and must be paid."26 Thus the problem of the
unscrupulous seller who would capriciously terminate the broker-seller relationship,
thereby destroying the broker's right to a commission, is avoided. The third re-
quirement in the new - that there be a transfer of title - conforms to the inten-
tions and realistic expectations of the parties. To repeat again, the broker expects
to produce a purchaser capable of completing the sales contract and thereby receive
his commission. 27 The seller intends to accept the purchaser produced without an
inquiry into his financial status and to pay the broker's commission from the ten-
dered purchase price.2 8  Therefore, the seller should not be barred from asserting
the purchaser's inability to perform as a complete defense to a broker's suit for his
commission.2 This approach is realistic and ". . . should not be complicated by
controversies over who knew what with respect to the buyer's financial capacity to
dose the title."' 30 Finally, the new rule forces the broker to produce an able buyer
and thereby assures to a seller acting in good faith the receipt of his bargain - a
transferred title. Thus the court has declared the risk of purchaser inability to be
a normal incident of the brokerage business. 31
After announcing this new and realistic rule, the court in Ellsworth went further
2 1 The requirement that the purchaser presented be "able" was seemingly included in the old
rule to protect a seller from a broker who himself might turn out to be unscrupulous. Leschziner
v. Bauman, 83 N.J.L. 743, 746, 85 A. 205, 206 (Ct. Err. & App. 1912) (Essential element of
the rule in Hinds v. Henry was the purchaser's ability to complete the contract).
2 2 Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 547-48, 236 A.2d 843, 853 (1967).
23 Compare, Hinds v. Henry, 36 N.J.L. 328 (Sup. Ct. 1873); and McGavock v. Woodlief,
61 U.S. (20 How.) 221 (1857) with Courter v. Lydecker, 71 N.JL. 511, 58 A. 1093 (Sup. Ct.
1904); Matz v. Bessman, 1 N.J.Misc. 5 (Super Ct. 1923); Richard v. Failed, 13 N.J.Super. 534,
81 A.2d 17 App. Div. (1951) and Kock v. Emnmerling, 63 U.S. 64 (1859).
24 Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 547-48, 236 A.2d 843, 853 (1967).
25 Id.
26 Id. at 551, 236 A.2d at 855.
27Id. at 551-52, 236 A.2d at 855.
28 Id. at 547, 236 A.2d at 852.
29 Id. at 551-52, 236 A.2d at 855.
31d. at 552, 236 A.2d at 855.
31Id.
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and declared that the broker here has a right of action for his commission against
the defaulting purchaser.32 This right of action is based upon the conclusion that a
purchaser who solicits a broker to find property for him implicitly promises that if
the broker finds suitable property and he executes a sales contract with the seller,
he will perform that contract. 3 His failure to do so makes him liable to the broker
for the amount of the commission.
It is axiomatic that a century of precedent should not be overturned unless the
need to do so is abundantly clear. The court in Ellsworth has not violated this prin-
ciple. The new rule, when coupled with the right of action given to the broker
against purchasers in cases of purchaser default, will do much to clarify and rational-
ize the broker-seller relationship in real estate transactions.
Joseph I. Cox
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-HOLDERS IN DuE CouRsE-American Plan
Corp. v. Woods, 16 Ohio App.2d 1, 240 N.E.2d 886 (1968)-A finance com-
pany, transferee, was held not to be a holder in due course of a negotiable note
given in the sale of consumer goods under a conditional sales contract where the
financer participated in business transactions with the dealer and had pervasive
knowledge of the terms on which the sale was made.
In 1962 Crystal Clear, Inc., offered to enter into an arrangement for discount-
ing notes, which it expected to receive from purchasers of water softeners, with the
American Plan Corporation. After a complete investigation of the dealer, the mem-
bers of the corporation, the type of merchandise being sold, the schedule of pay-
ments, and approximate price of the merchandise American Plan agreed to the ar-
rangement.' Thereafter, it supplied the dealer with blank notes and security agree-
ments, but it reserved the right to refuse any notes which it felt were too risky after
it had made an investigation of the purchaser's credit. American Plan Corporation
accepted an assignment, without recourse, of the note in question two working days
after it was executed.
The uncontradicted testimony of the defendant Woods, a Negro lady with little
business experience, revealed that she had been the victim of a "hard sell." She
was told by the dealer, who at the time of the trial had "fled the realm," that she
was not buying anything. He said the water softener was being offered to her as
advertising, and that she would be paid 50 dollars for each purchaser she produced
for the dealer. In fact, the 100 dollars she did pay to American Plan was from the
money she had received from the dealer for leads she had given him.
Relying principally upon the authority of Unico v. Owens,2 the court held that
the American Plan Corporation, because of its close participation with the dealer,
was not a holder in due course under Section 1303.31 of the Ohio Revised Code
[U.C.C. 3-3021. In the Unico case, a partnership, formed expressly to finance a
dealer, Universal Stereo Corporation, was denied the status of a holder in due course
32 Id. at 558-62, 236 A.2d at 859-61; Tanner Associates, Inc. v. Ciraldo, 33 N.J. 51, 161 A.2d
725 (1960).
33 Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 558-62, 236 A.2d 843, 859-61 (1967).
1 Brief for Appellant at 3, American Plan Corp. v. Woods, motion to certify docketed, No.
68-680, Ohio Supreme Court, December 9, 1968; motion overruled, May 21, 1969.
2 50 N.J. 101, 232, A.2d 405 (1967).
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of a negotiable note taken by Universal in connection with a sale made under an
unconscionable retail installment sales contract. The court noted that under an
elaborate financing agreement, "... Unico not only had a thorough knowledge of
the nature and method of operation of Universal's business, but also exercised ex-
tensive control over it."
'
The development of the doctrine that a finance company may be denied the
status of a holder in due course because of its dose participation with a dealer,
either in the course of business or in a particular transaction, is said to have begun
with Commercial Credit Co. v. Childs,4 decided in 1940. That case held that a fi-
nance company which took assignment on the day of execution of a note and an
attached conditional sales contract, which it supplied to the retailer and on which
there was a printed assignment, was not a holder in due course. The water softener
was installed, but it proved defective within one month.
The basic rationale of the dose participation doctrine was stated in Buffalo In-
dustrial Bank v. DeMarzio.5 The court pointed out that the nation had passed,
"almost overnight," from a situation in which the ordinary retail purchaser received
credit on his personal, unsecured promise to pay to a situation in which the con-
ditional sales contract was the ordinary purchaser's normal, if not exclusive, means
of securing credit.6 The court noted that in many instances finance companies
which, in fact, controlled a dealer's installment sales terms, were functioning as de
facto credit departments of the dealer's business. Since they were in effect engag-
ing in one business, the court held that the financer should not be allowed to hide
behind the protective concept of holder in due course which had been developed
in the ancient law merchant for entirely different purposes.7
Although Commercial Credit Co. v. Childss is considered the landmark case,
two other courts reached the same result under similar facts that same year 9 The
next year the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, citing both
of those cases, held that a finance company which regularly discounted notes exe-
cuted on forms supplied by it and which included printed special endorsements to
it was not a holder in due course.10
Similar results have been reached in a number of later cases where the facts have
indicated dose participation by the finance company in the business operations of
the dealer. Thus, where, in addition to supplying the dealer with blank forms
which include a printed assignment to it, the finance company supplies schedules
for calculating charges and instructions on how to complete the forms," or it in-
vestigates the customers' credit before the sale' 2 it has been held not to be a holder
in due course. The same result has also been reached in cases in which the financer
3id. at 115, 232 A.2d at 413.
4 199 Ark. 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940).
5162 Mfisc. 742, 296 N.Y.S. 783 (City Ct. of Buffalo 1937), rev'd on other grounds, 6
N.Y.S.2d 568 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
Old. at 743-4, 296 N.Y.S. at 785. See Curran, Legislative Controls as a Response to Con-
sumer Credit Frauds, 8 B.C. IND. & COm. L. REV. 409 (1967).
7See Jones, Finance Companies as Holders in Due Course of Consumer Paper, 1958 WASH.
U. L. Q. 177.
8 199 Ark 1073, 137 S.W.2d 260 (1940).
9 U. S. v. Schaeffer, 33 F. Supp. 547 (D. Md. 1940). C.I.T. Co. v. Emmons, 197 So. 662
(La. App. 1940).
10 Palmer v. Associates Discount Corp., 124 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
1" C.I.T. Co. v. Emmons, 197 So. 662 (La. App. 1940).
'2 Mutual Finance Co. v. Martin, 63 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1953); Industrial Credit Co. v. Mike
Bradford & Co., 177 So. 2d 878 (Fla. App. 1965).
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was found to have directed13 or to have been the moving force 14 behind the trans-
action.
Although no Ohio court had previously accepted the close participation doctrine
in full, it had been partially accepted in Davis v. Commercial Credit Corp.15 In
that case the fmancer supplied the dealer with blank forms including printed en-
dorsements and regularly discounted his paper. The court held that the financer
had knowledge of the dealers defective work, fraudulent representations, and gen-
eral methods of operation because it knew of previous complaints from the dealer's
other customers. The court found that the financer, with this knowledge, conspired
with the dealer to take his paper and collect its full face, on the theory that the
financer was a holder in due course. 16
The Davis case, like most of the cases discussed above, was decided under the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (N.I.L.). Today, under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code (U.C.C.), the definition of notice as "reason to know" (on the basis
of the facts actually known) may make reaching this result easier than it was under
the N.I.L.17 The court gave no indication whether this change in the law was im-
portant to its decision. Unico, on which the court so heavily relied, was decided
under the N.I.L. But in that case, the court clearly stated it would reach the same
result under either statute.
This failure to discuss the significance of the change in the law is important
since the court also failed to delineate the particular facts which lead it to find close
participation. The fact that American Plan Corporation investigated Crystal Clear
and took its "say so" on which notes to discount indicates a degree of close par-
ticipation.' 8 The relationship however, was not as pervasive as it was in Unico and
some of the other close participation cases. It is impossible, therefore, to determine
whether the same result would have been reached under the N.I.L. Thus it is un-
certain as to whether or not the court believed that the extention of the doctrine was
made possible by the change from the N.I.L. to the U.C.C.
Not all courts and jurisdictions which have had the opportunity19 have accepted
the close participation doctrine. In Louisiana, the broad rule stated in C.I.T. Co.
v. Emmons20 has been subsequently narrowed but not overruled. 21 Several courts
have held that facts such as supplying blank forms and printed assignments, taking
immediate assignment after execution, and prior discounting of other notes for the
13 Citizens Loan Corp. v. Robbins, 40 So. 2d 503 (La. App. 1949); International Finance
Corp. v. Hieger, 272 Minn. 192, 137 N.W.2d 172 (1965).
14 Commercial Credit Corp. v. Orange County Mach. Wks., 34 Cal. 2d 766, 214 P.2d 819
(1950).
15 87 Ohio App. 311, 94 N.E.2d 710 (1950).
16Id. at 319, 94 N.E.2d at 714.
17 See U.C.C. §§ 3-302, 1-201 (19), 1-201 (25) (c); see also Clovis, The Low Income Buyer.
The Poor Consumer as the Maker of a Negotiable Note, in Ohio State Legal Services Association,
COURSE ON LAW AND POVERTY, (1966) 5 1.57.
18 American Plan Corp. v. Georgia Woods, Civil Division, No. 167714, The Mun. Ct. of
Columbus, Ohio; Sept. 9, 1965, at 6.
19 See Jones, Finance Companies as Holders in Due Course of Consumer Paper, 1958 WAsH.
U. L. Q. 177. The appendix summarizes most of the cases with fact patterns which might have
brought them within the doctrine, even if the doctrine were not discussed or expressly consid-
ered in the case. See also Annot., 44 A.LR.2d 8, especially §§ 20-24.
20 197 So. 662 (La. App. 1940).
21White System, Inc. v. Hall, 219 La. 440, 53 So. 2d 227 (1951).
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dealer are not enough, standing alone, to indicate the close participation needed to
negative the financer's status as a holder in due course.22
One reason frequently given by courts rejecting the dose participation doctrine
is that,
A very considerable segment of our economy is dependent for its con-
tinued prosperity upon such free flow of credit and anything which delays
or impedes such process may well be regarded as against the public in-
terest.2
3
This argument, however, is refuted by the continued commercial health of the va-
rious jurisdictions in which the doctrine has been applied.
More particular and fundamental objections have been raised, however 24 The
most significant of these, from the point of view of the dose participation doctrine,
is that the very indicia being used as evidence of dose participation are really evi-
dence of good business practice in a competitive market. ' The finance companies,
it is argued, rather than controlling the dealers whose paper they regularly discount
are vigorously competing with each other for the dealers business. 26 The services
which they supply to the dealer, such as blank forms with printed assignments and
quick discounting of all or most of the dealers paper, do not reveal either knowl-
edge of nor control over the dealers' methods. Rather they reveal the extent to
which finance companies must go to retain dealers as customers of their discounting
service2
The law of negotiable instruments developed at a time when commerce was ex-
panding rapidly. Merchants were unable, due to the rudimentary communications
systems of the times, to investigate each other. They therefore relied solely on the
form of instruments for protection. This is no longer true. Likewise the holder
in due course doctrine developed in response to a situation where instruments were
transferred many times. The holder in due course doctrine facilitated this free flow
of commercial instruments. In a situation where there is close participation between
financer and retailer, form is not important. Neither is the policy of promoting
the free flow of negotiable instruments relevant since only one transfer is made.
Consequently, the concept of holder in due course, arguably at least, should not
apply to the close participation situation 2 8
It is also argued that application of the dose participation doctrine increases the
risk of uncollectibility upon the finance companies. This, it is asserted, creates un-
desirable uncertainty in the market for consumer paper; this, in turn, allegedly de-
22U. S. v. Tholen 186 F. Supp. 346 (N. D. Iowa 1960); Public Loan Corp. v. Terrell, 224
Ark. 616, 275 S.W.2d 435 (1955); Mann v. Leasko 4 Cal. Rptr. 124 (Dist. Ct App. 1960);
Wilson v. Gorden, 91 A.2d 329 (D. C. Cir. 1952); Allied Bldg. Credits, Inc. v. Mathewson 335
Mich. 270, 55 N.W.2d 826 (1952); Implement Credit Corp. v. Elsinger, 66 N.W.2d 657 (Wis.
1954).
23 Implement Credit Corp. v. Elsinger, 66 N.W.2d 657, 666 (Wis. 1954).
24 See Kripke, Chattel Paper as a Negotiable Speciality under the Uniform Commercial Code,
59 YALE L. J. 1209 (1950) [Hereinafter cited as, Kripke, Chattel Paper]; Shuchman, Consumer
Credit by Adhesion Contracts, 35 TEMPLE L Q. 125, (1962).
2 5 Shucbman, Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contract 1l, 35 TEMPLE L. Q. 281, 286 (1962).
26 See Kripke, Consumer Credit Regulation: A Creditor-Oriented Viewpoint, 68 COLUM. L.
REV. 445 (1968) (Hereinafter cited as Kripke, Consumer Regulation.).
27 id.
28 See Jones, Finance Companies as Holders in Due Course of Consumer Paper, 1958 WASH.
U. L. Q. 177; B. CURPAN, Legislative Controls as a Response to Consumer Credit Frauds, 8 B.C.
INn. & COM. L. REv. 409 (1967).
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prives dealers of needed liquidity and raises the price of consumer credit. o Not
only is this problem considerably overrated,30 but it misses the point. First of all,
since the finance company has both the means and ability to investigate the finan-
cial stability of dealers, they, rather than the ignorant and incapable consumer, should
assume this risk.3 ' If this means that dealers must depend upon their reputation
for honesty and their financial stability for their liquidity, so much the better. Even
if this would make it difficult for honest but economically marginal dealers to exist
why should this small group be protected at the expense of a large number of un-
wary installment buyers?32 Another factor to consider is the regard which a sig-
nificant section of the community will hold for our law and our economic system
after they have been forced, because they can not assert any defenses, to pay for
defective purchases. If the application of the doctrine would result in finance com-
panies getting stuck, occasionally, with uncollectible notes because the maker had
an adequate defense against the dealer, the finance companies could easily calculate
the statistical frequency and magnitude of such losses and set up reserves.33
If the doctrine would have the effect of raising the cost of consumer credit, it
would to the same degree effect a "pooling" of the risk among the users of con-
sumer credit.3 4 This credit would, therefore, be more expensive only to those who
would never have been the victim of a "bad deal."
The dose participation doctrine has not been the only judicial response to the
problem created by the tremendous increase in retail installment selling. Waiver-
of-defense clauses, included in most of the conditional sales contracts and which the
consumer normally signs in addition to the negotiable note, have met with a judi-
cial response similar to that given to holders in due course of negotiable instru-
ments.35 There has also been a considerable legislative response. Many states have
enacted retail installment sales acts which deal with all or part of the problem in
various ways. 3 6 In addition to the state legislative response a uniform solution was
proposed in the early drafts of the U.C.C.
As originally conceived, the U.C.C. would have taken three steps toward meet-
ing the problem.37 First, it would have allowed a consumer to assert any defenses
available under the conditional sales contract against a holder in due course of the
note who asserted rights against the collateral. Second, it would have required that
financers observe reasonable commercial standards as a condition to being a holder
in due course. Third, it would have rendered waiver-of-defense clauses unenforce-
able. Unfortunately, these controversial provisions were dropped in order not to
jeopardize acceptance of the Code.38 The cudgal has, however, been taken up
2 9 Kripke, Chattel Paper, at 1214-1222.
30 Id. at 1215.
3 1 Note, Consumer Sales Financing: Placing the Risk of Defective Goods, 102 U. PA. L. REV.
782 (1954).
32 Id. at 796.
3 3 Kripke, Consumer Regulation, at 470.
3 4 Kripke, Chattel Paper, at 1222.
3 5 See Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L. J. 1057,
1093-1102 (1954).
36 See B. CURLAN, Legislative Controls as a Response to Consumer-Credit Problems, 8 B.C.
IND. & COM. L. REv. 409 (1967); Murphy, Another Assault Upon the Citadel: Limiting the
Use of Negotiable Notes and Waiver of Defense Clauses in Consumer Sales, 29 O.S. UJ. 667
(1968).
3 Id. at 678.
38 Id. at 679.
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again by the National Council of Commissioners on Uniform State Law in their
proposed draft of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (U3C). As proposed, the
U3C would severely limit the use of negotiable instruments and waiver-of-defense
dauses in retail installment selling.39
In connection with the proposed U3C it should be noted that Professor Kripke,40
a long time opponent of legislative or judicial action in the retail installment sales
area, has recently repudiated his former position.4 1 Though he continues to regard
the dose participation doctrine and similar judicial responses as based upon a mis-
understanding of the significance of the indicia used to find dose participation, he
now approves the U3C position. In reaching this new position he said,
The clinching argument is the contrast between the legal relationship in
consumer financing and the legal relationship in the financing of commer-
cial accounts receivable. In that field the financial institutions, many of
which are also engaged in the consumer field, have never sought to extend
to the commercial field their assertion that they are entitled to freedom
from customer defenses. There is one reason for this: the commercial buy-
ers would not stand for it, for the purchase contracts are not contracts of
adhesion.42 What then happens to the question of freedom from de-
fenses in the commercial field? The financer as a part of its credit de-
termination studies the experience of the seller in respect to customer
complaints and returned goods, and if the percentage is too high, refuses
to do business with that merchant. The same type of thinking would
provide the answer in the consumer field.43 [Emphasis added].
A uniform, coherent legislative solution is, of course, the best answer to the
problem. Until that is achieved, however, courts must work with the concepts and
doctrines available to achieve a just result. In this case, the court did just that. By
taking the small steps available to them, courts can make it easier for the legisla-
ture to achieve a more complete solution, for it is often easier to codify existing law
than to make new law.
Joel T. Thomas
CONTRACTS-PASSENGER CONTRACTS-STATUTE OF LMITATIONS PROVISIONS
ON STEAMSHIP TIcKETs-Silvestri v. Italia Societa Per Azioni Di Navigazione,
388 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1968)-On June 20, 1966, Ciro Silvestri filed a libel action
in the District Court for the Southern District of New York to recover damages for
an injury sustained on October 9, 1964 as a result of a lurch by defendant's ship on
which he was a passenger. The Italian Line moved for summary judgment because
of Silvestri's failure to comply with Artide 30 of the Terms and Conditions of his
ticket. That section stipulated that, in order to maintain a claim against the com-
pany, a passenger must commence his action within one year from the date of in-
39 Id. at 680-1.
40 Professor Kripke stated in a footnote to his article in 68 COLum. L REv. 445, that he was
associated for 20 years with the consumer finance industry, in companies with important con-
sumer finance departments, as staff cosel and as an officer.
41 Kripke, Consumer Regulation, at 471.
42 Philip Shuchman, "Consumer Credit by Adhesion Contract Il," 35 TEMPLE L Q. 281
(1962).
4SKripke, Consumer Regulation at 2.
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jury.' It was shown by affidavit supporting the motion that Silvestri had the ticket
in his possession at least three days before boarding the ship, that he had looked at
it prior to embarking, and that he had consulted a lawyer in Italy. The District
Court granted the motion for summary judgment for failure to begin the action
within one year, a contractual period of limitation sanctioned by 46 U.S.C. § 183
(a) 2 However, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding that
a steamship passenger's ticket must give reasonable notice that the terms and condi-
tions printed on the leaves of the coupon retained by the passenger "... were im-
portant matters of contract affecting his legal rights."3
In so holding the appellate court seems to have moved toward the English
method of deciding whether or not the conditions printed on a steamship passenger's
ticket are binding on the passenger. In the past, American courts have tried to follow
the rule laid down by the United States Supreme Court in The Majestic.4 The
Majestic held that conditions on the back of a ticket which limited liability must
either be referred to in the body of the ticket contract or must be brought to the
actual notice of the passenger. Since it would be virtually impossible for steamship
companies to insure that the conditions have been brought to the actual knowledge
of each passenger, the companies have, of necessity, resorted to various other ways
of ensuring that the conditions are incorporated into the contract for passage. The
courts have struggled with the question as to whether or not the companies have suc-
ceeded.
In legal theory, when an offeree accepts a paper purporting to be a contract, this
acceptance implies assent to the terms and conditions printed on that paper whether
or not he has actual knowledge of them. Acceptance may be indicated by an act.
Accordingly, a steamship passenger's purchase and receipt of a ticket which suffi-
ciently purports to be a contract is also acceptance of all the terms and conditions
printed on that ticket (unless they are against public policy or void for some other
reason). Whether this legal theory applies to a particular case in which a passenger
accepts a steamship ticket has, in the past, depended a great deal on the form of the
ticket. The Majestic held that the terms and conditions could be binding contractual
provisions if they were incorporated into the ticket proper (i.e. that part of the ticket
showing that the passenger is entitled to passage on a certain ship at a certain time).
I ARTCLE 30 - InITATION OF ACTION AGAINsr THE COMPANY - No action or
proceeding against the Company for death or injury of any kind to the passenger shall
be instituted, unless written notice is given to the Company or its duly authorized
Agent within six months from the day when the death or injury occured and the action
or suit arising therefrom is commenced within one year from the date when the death
or injury occured. No action or suit against the Company for loss or damage to bag-
gage or for detention of the passenger or delay in landing or any other cause shall be
instituted by the passenger unless written notice of the claim with full particulers be
delivered to the Company or its duly authorized Agent at the port of debarkation within
ten days from the date of landing, and such action or suit is commenced within six
months after the termination of the voyage.
2 This section provides that:
It shall be unlawful for the manager, agent, master, or owner of any sea-going vessel
(other than tugs, barges, fishing vessels and their tenders) transporting passengers or
merchandise or property from or between ports of the United States and foreign ports
to provide by rule, contract, regulation, or otherwise a shorter period for giving notice
of, or filing claims for loss of life or bodily injury, than six months, and for the insti-
tution of suits on such claims, than one year, such period of institution of suits to be
computed from the day when the death or injury occured.
3388 F.2d 11, 17 (2d Cir. 1968).
4 166 U.S. 375 (1897).
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However, the opinion set forth no standards for deciding the necessary requirements
for establishing that the terms and conditions were so incorporated.
American courts did not readily accept the idea that the conditions on a ticket
could be incorporated into the ticket proper, although it must be taken into account
that the form of the tickets in question did not easily lend itself to a holding for
incorporation.5 In La Bourgogne,0 where the conditions were printed on the back
of the ticket and no one on behalf of the company drew the passenger's attention
to them, the court held the conditions had not been incorporated. In The Minne-
tonkaj the conditions again were on the back of the ticket, the only difference be-
ing that they were under a heading in large type: "Notice to Passengers." Further-
more, the conditions themselves were printed in double columns of very small type,
and so compactly "as to be almost illegible to one whose sight was at all imperfect."
In Smith v. North German Lloyd S.S. Co.,9 the court was "unable to distinguish
the case from The Majestic (citations omitted) except that the notice is printed on
the front, instead of the back, of the ticket."'()
However, in 1891, a Massachusetts Supreme Court case, Fonseca v. Cunard S.S.
Co."3 had held for incorporation and it was to have an impact. In that case the
steamship company had provided a different form of ticket for the court to con-
sider. The Fonseca ticket was entitled "Passenger Contract Ticket" and contained
terms and conditions bearing the signature of the agent of the company, with a
blank space for that of the passenger. Some of the conditions were printed on the
face of the ticket and those on the back were referred to on the face. Although the
passenger neither read the conditions nor signed them, the court held that they were
enforceable. Distinguishing cases where the ticket was held to be a mere check or
token showing the distance the passenger was entitled to be carried, in which case
the conditions are not binding unless the passenger has read them, the court stated
that the test should be whether the ticket was such that the passenger receiving it
could ascertain at a glance that it was a contract containing stipulations which would
determine the rights of the parties. With the ticket in Fonseca the court held that
one could easily see it was a contract.
In Murray v. Cunard S.S. Co.,' 2 Justice Cardozo adopted the approach of Fon-
seca and cases ruling for incorporation in other jurisdictions and introduced a new
line of authority.' 3 The Murray ticket was headed in large type: "Cabin Passage
Contract Ticket"; it provided in large type that "this contract ticket is issued by
the company and accepted by the passenger on the following terms and conditions."
At the top of the ticket was the notice that: "The attention of passengers is specially
directed to the terms and conditions of this contract." In enforcing a condition re-
quiring written notice of a possible claim within forty days, Cardozo stated as fol-
lows:
This is not a case of a mere notice on the back of a ticket, separate either
5 This discussion will center on the decisions of the Second Circuit, but the problems involved
are representative of those encountered in other jurisdictions.
0 144 F. 781 (2d Cir. 1906).
7 146 F. 509 (2d Cir. 1906).
8Id. at 512.
0 151 F. 222 (2d Cir. 1907).
10 Id.
11153 Mass. 553, 27 N.E. 665 (1891).
12235 N. Y. 162, 139 N. E. 226 (1923).
13 Id. at 166, 139 N.E. at 288.
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in substance or in form from the body of the contract [as in The Ma-
jestic]. Here the condition is wrought into the issue, the two inseparably
integrated. This ticke , to the most casual observer, is as plainly a contract,
burdened with all kinds of conditions, as if it were a bill of lading or a
policy of insurance .... In such circumstances, the act of acceptance gives
rise to an implication of assent. ... The passenger who omits to read
takes the risks of omission.14
Despite the Murray opinion, the decisions continued to rule against incorpora-
tion by distinguishing Murray and, in effect, limiting Murray to its particular facts.
In Baer v. North German Lloyd,'5 the ticket involved had the usually filled-in sec-
tion (the contract proper or "box") giving the date of sailing, the name of the ship,
the signature of the steamship company's agent, and in general showing that the
passenger was entitled to passage. Below this section was a heading which referred
to the terms and conditions. The court held that because the conditions had not
been referred to in the ticket proper they were not "wrought into the issue." In
Maibrunn v. Hamburg-American SS. Co.'8 a notice directing the passenger's atten-
tion to the conditions on the back of the ticket was printed on the side of the con-
tract proper (the filled-in section). The court again held that this notice did not
make the conditions binding - only the contract proper, which the court defined as
those words signed by the steamship company's agent, could be binding on the pas-
senger. The Kungsholm17 was a case in which the steamship company had devised
a ticket whereby the filled-in section was on the upper left hand side. The right
hand side was entitled "Cruise Contract" and stated in large type "The following
stipulations are a part of this contract which must be signed by the passenger on
the overpage immediately upon its receipt." In refusing to enforce this notification
the court followed Maibrunn and based its discussion on the place of the company's
signature. With regard to this ticket the court stated that ".... there [was] nothing
above the carrier's signature to incorporate expressly or by reference any of these
stipulations .... ,18
Finally, in Baron v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique'9 the Second Circuit
did rule that a steamship ticket successfully incorporated the conditions printed on
the ticket. First, the ticket was entitled "Passage Contract. Subject to the Terms
Stated on This Page and Overpage." Below this was a filled-in section, which was
followed by a notice in red type that "Passengers should read the terms of the con-
tract of carriage stated below and overpage, their particular attention being called
to the limitations of liability therein contained." Following this was the heading
"Terms of Contract - Read Before Accepting." At the foot of these terms was
the signature of the company's agent. The court held that these terms were unmis-
takably incorporated into the contract of passage: "Everything printed on the ticket
rebuts the contention that the contract of carriage was restricted to the blocked-space
for names, dates, and fares."20
Foster v. Cunard White Star Ltd42 did away with the place of signature dis-
tinction relied on in Maibrunn, The Kungsholm, and Baron by reading the terms
14Id.
15 69 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1934).
10 77 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1935).
17 86 .2d 703 (2d Cir. 1936).
I8 Id. at 704.
19 108 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1939).
20 Id. at 23.
21121 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1941).
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back into the box so that they preceeded the carrier's signature, provided that there
was "a direct reference in the box on the face of the ticket to the terms and condi-
tions of the contract .... ,22 The Foster court held that the "box" which contained
a notice in the upper part in bold face type directing the passenger's attention to the
terms and conditions which were on the side of that "box" did incorporate those
conditions. And in Geller v. Holland America Line2- the court held that:
[I]t is the settled law in this circuit that passengers will be bound by
such a provision [a time limitation] in the contract of carriage, if the pro-
vision is incorporated, at least by reference, in the body of the contract.24
However, in Silvestri the court has stated that:
[T]he thread that runs implicitly through the cases sustaining incorpo-
ration is that the steamship line had done all it reasonably could to warn
the passengers that the terms and conditions were important matters of
contract affecting his legal rights.25
In determining that the Silvestri ticket did not incorporate the time limitation stated
therein, the court compared this ticket with the forms used by other steamship com-
panies. Emphasis was placed on what reasonably could be expected. The court
found that "Nothing whatever was done to impress the importance of the terms and
conditions upon the passenger."2 6
The filled-in section or "box" of the Silvestri ticket bore the heading "Passage
Contract" in Italian and English. Also within the box was a statement warning the
passenger that the ticket was subject to terms and conditions printed on the cover of
the ticket. The court found that the inconspicuousness of this statement in com-
parison with the other printed material inside the "box" did not afford reasonable
notice to the passenger of the terms and conditions to which it referred 27
Although on its face the ticket does not incorporate the time limitation, the
court apparently will allow the steamship company to prove the limitation is enforce-
221Id. at 13.
23 298 F.2d 618 (2d Cir. 1962).
24 Id. at 619.
2-388 F.2d 11, 17 (2d Cir. 1968).
20 Id.
27 The court, at page 14 of the opinion, had stated:
Here the 'box' bore in the upper right hand corner the words:
BIG=LTro Di PASSAGIO
PASSAGE CONThACr
followed by an identifying number, and in the lower right hand corner the validating
stamp of the issuing travel agent. Almost all of the captions in the 'box' were in cap-
ital or boldface letters, the major exception being the following statements, which ap-
peared in the upper left hand corner of the ticket in ordinary lower-case one-eighteenth
inch type:
Subject to the conditions printed on the cover of this ticket which form part of
this contract.
The inconspicuousness of these statements was increased by the fact that they were
squeezed immediately below a caption in bold face and to the left of one in capital
letters. The two 'leaves' which are an integral part of the coupon retained by the pas-
senger were headed 'TERis AND CONDmONs' in boldface. Then followed 35 num-
bered paragraphs in very small print. At the end were spaces for the signature by or
for the passenger, but neither Silvestri nor any representative signed.
Id. at 14.
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able because the passenger had ample opportunity to become aware of the conditions
on the ticket. The court states that:
It may be argued also that the lawyer whom Silvestri consulted in Italy
after he discarded the ticket should have been aware that steamship tickets
commonly contain limitations on the time for bringing suit, could have ob-
tained a duplicate from the Italian Line to which he complained, and per-
haps even did so.28
The court also points out that if Silvestri had actual knowledge of the time limita-
tion because of his lawyer's advice the case would be different. So it would seem
that the Second Circuit will now apply a broader test in deciding whether condi-
tions printed on a steamship ticket are binding on the passenger. It will look to
the form of the ticket to see if it reasonably gives notice of the conditions, as com-
pared with other tickets, and it will look to see if a particular passenger knew or
reasonably should have known about the conditions.
The court has adopted the approach of the English cases which have considered
whether a steamship ticket's terms and conditions can be binding on the passenger
who accepts the ticket. The English courts since The Majestic have not been so
concerned with whether the ticket is a contract, but whether, in the circumstances
of a particular case, especially the opportunity afforded to learn of the conditions,
the passenger was bound by them.
In Marriott v. Yeoward Bros.2 9 the court found that the conditions printed dear-
ly and legibly on the plaintiff's ticket were binding. Although the plaintiff had
not known there were conditions on the ticket she had accepted, she did know that
there was writing on the ticket in addition to her name. Therefore the defendant
had done what was reasonably sufficient to bring the conditions on the ticket to the
notice of the plaintiff. In Cooke v. T. Wilson & Sons3o the terms and conditions
were in plain legible type, and although the passenger knew that generally there
were conditions relating to contracts of travel, she was not aware that they were on
the particular ticket she had accepted. The court held that she ought to have been
aware of the conditions, and shipping companies should not be made to provide for
people who will not read what is put before them. In Dill v. Grand Trunk Pacific
Coast S.S. Co.31 the court found that the ticket was very common in appearance with
the conditions on its face, that the plaintiff was acquainted with traveling on these
boats, and that she had ample time to read the ticket. Therefore the company had
done all that was reasonably required to notify the plaintiff and she was bound by
the conditions. In the leading English case, Hood v. Anchor Line (Henderson
Bros.) Ltd.,32 the ticket was inside an envelope when given to the passenger's agent.
On the outside of the envelope a printed finger pointed to the words "Please read
conditions of the enclosed contract." On the face of the ticket, in large type were
the words "Notice. This ticket is issued to and accepted by the passenger subject
to the following conditions," and at the bottom of the ticket was another notice
"Passengers are particularly requested to carefully read the above ticket." The
House of Lords found that the passenger was given "conspicuous notice" and, while
the defendant shipping company had the burden of proving it had done all it rea-
sonably could to notify the passenger, the court was unable to see by what better
28 Id. at 18.
29 [1909] 2 K.B. 987.
30 32 T.L.R. 160 (1915).
3121 B.C. 182 (1915).
32 [1918) A.C. 837.
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means the passenger would have been made knowledgeable that the ticket with its
conditions would affect his legal rights.
In light of these English cases and the facts which Judge Friendly states may be
important in the Silvestri case, it would seem that in the future the decisions on the
question of whether the conditions printed on the steamship ticket are considered as
part of a contract will not be as dependent on the form of the ticket. As long as
the ticket attempts to notify the passenger of the conditions in a dear and legible
manner the conditions will be binding if a reasonable passenger in the circumstances
could or should have been aware of them. It is this last qualification as to the cir-
cumstances in which the passenger received the ticket that the earlier cases largely
ignored. It was assumed that buying a steamship ticket was a matter of great de-
liberation and a passenger would naturally pay more attention than he would to
something like a baggage check.33 Therefore, if the ticket did incorporate the con-
ditions printed on the ticket the passenger could not have been duped and the ticket
would be no different than an insurance contract or a bill of lading. Examining
the surrounding circumstances may prove to be a more practical way of determining
whether or not the company has done all it can to warn the passenger that by accept-
ing a ticket he is affecting his contract rights. But in light of the fact that most
passengers do not even look at their tickets, even casually, and that they are unaware
that tickets are contracts, it would seem that the theory of these cases should be the
same as that in cases concerning baggage checks. In enforcing the conditions in
Murray, Cardozo wrote that "a contract valid and reasonable in its inception does
not become invalid and unreasonable thereafter" 34 because the passenger paid no
attention to the conditions nor realized that there was any need to refer to them.
If the steamship tickets were the result of negotiation between two equal parties,
then it should be true that the passenger takes the risk of not reading the conditions.
But even if the passenger is actually aware of the time limitations for filing suit
printed on the ticket he has no alternative to accepting them. He must either take
under the conditions printed on his ticket, or find some other way of getting where
he wants to go. He never has the opportunity of bargaining with the steamship
company.
The justifications for limitations on the monetary amount of liability on a ticket
consist of the argument that unlimited liability would place too great a burden on
the shipping industry. Furthermore, the passenger would be better able to estimate
the possible extent of liability and thus be the better risk bearer. However, this is
not the case with limitations on the time for filing suit. In upholding a limitation
allowing forty days in which to give the steamship company notification of injury
Justice Cardozo stated that:
Limitations of this kind have their justification in the need of some safe-
guard to protect the carrier against fraud. Passengers on steamships scatter
in all directions when the voyage is at an end. If claims may be presented
at any time within the term of years permitted by the Statute of Limita-
tions, the opportunity for investigation will often be lost beyond recall.35
Justice Cardozo seems to have forgotten that the court and jury system were desired
as an intelligent way of deciding which daims deserve recompense and which do not.
In effect, The Majestic decision allowed steamship companies to place an extra
burden on the plaintiff in getting his claim heard by a court. The lower courts have
33 Steers v. Liverpool, 57 N.Y. 1, 5 (1874).
34 235 N. Y. 162, 166; 139 N.E. 226, 228.
351d. at 165.
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shown their dissatisfaction with this by reading the ticket, until recently, as narrowly
as possible in order to make the time limitations ineffective, and thereby protecting
the plaintiff's cause of action. Since the enactment of U.S.C. § 183b(1) which was
designed to eliminate abuses of shippers who put unreasonable time limitations in
their tickets 36 the courts have been more willing to enforce these limitations.3 7 And,
although the steamship company did lose in the appellate court in Silvestri, it is ap-
parent that under the broader rule of Silvestri (i.e. considering the form of the ticket
and the circumstances in which it was received), this trend will continue.
Cheryl Keith
HOUSING ACT-INJUNCTIVE RELIEF FOR PERSONs DISPLACED BY URBAN RE-
NEWAL P~ojncTs-Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395
F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968)-A new avenue of relief has been opened to "displacees"
of urban renewal projects by the Second Circuit decision in Norwalk CORE v. Nor-
walk Redevelopment Agency.1 The court held that persons displaced by such proj-
ects may seek equitable relief in federal courts when government efforts to assure
their relocation have not been adequate under Section 105 (c) of the Housing Act.2
Norwalk began as a class action brought by the Norwalk Chapter of the Con-
gress of Racial Equality, two tenants' associations and several individuals represent-
ing low-income Negroes and Puerto Ricans. Plaintiffs joined as defendants the
Norwalk Redevelopment Agency [hereinafter "the Agency"J, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), private developers and several others
connected with South Norwalk Project No. 1 (Project No. Conn. R-34).3 They
sought an injunction prohibiting construction of middle income housing which
was planned for part of the site. They also sought an order directing construction
of low income housing on that site for the minority groups so displaced.4
Plaintiffs asserted that a shortage of public and private housing and rampant
discrimination in the Norwalk housing market limited the relocation facilities
3 6 
Mulvihill v. Furness Withy & Co., 136 F. Supp. 201 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
37 388 F.2d 11, 17.
1395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
242 U.S.C. § 1455 (c) (Supp. 1967). This section provides that Loan and Capital Grant
Contracts between the Federal government and municipal agencies under which federal funds
are made available to municipalities for urban renewal projects shall require that -
"(c) (1) There shall be a feasible method for the temporary relocation of individuals
and families displaced from the urban renewal area, and there are being provided not
generally less desirable in regard to public utilities and public and commercial facilities
and at rents or prices within the financial means of the individuals and families dis-
placed from the urban renewal area, decent, safe and sanitary dwellings equal in num-
ber to the number of and available to such displaced individuals and families and
reasonably accessible to their place of employment..."
3 395 F.2d at 923. Under the Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1460
(Supp. 1957), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) (formerly the
Housing and Home Finance Agency) is authorized to enter into Loan and Capital Grant Con-
tracts with Local Public Agencies (such as the Norwalk Redevelopment Agency). If certain
conditions are met, including the relocation standard referred to in note 2, supra, HUD gives
low-interest loans and grants to the Local Public Agencies (L.P.A.s). HUD also performs the
function of insuring L.P.A. payment to private developers hired by the L.P.A.s.




available to non-white displacees. The agency was aware of this situation at the
time it contracted with HUD but it made no provision for housing the minority
group families. Plaintiffs alleged that these families were relocated into sub-
standard housing or forced to flee the city. White displacees, it was asserted, were
not faced with similar hardships. Therefore, plaintiffs claimed that the Agency
had intentionally denied the minority group displacees equal protection of the laws.
Furthermore, HUD and the Agency had violated Section 105(c) of the Housing
Act.
The Second Circuit held that displacees had standing to seek judicial relief for
violation of Section 105(c) standards. Hitherto displacees had been denied stand-
ing on the basis of three theories: (1) that Congress intended to cut off review of
the statute; (2) that all that Section 105(c) had established was contract rights
between HUD and the Local Public Agencies5 [hereinafter L.P.A.s]; and (3)
that the interests of displacees was indistinguishable from the interests of the pub-
lic at large. 6 The Court in Norwalk construed Congress' intention otherwise
and recognized that the only persons affected by Section 105 (c) were displacees.7
The Norwalk case will probably be remembered primarily for its holding
that the plaintiffs' equal protection claim presented a justiciable issue. Generally,
most state courts have been reluctant to hear challenges against urban renewal
projects.8 This reluctance stems from the difficulty of fashioning justiciable stand-
ards, the fear of encroaching on areas traditionally left to the legislatures, and
the necessity of political discretion in this area.9 Equal protection claims in con-
nection with urban renewal projects have been shunned by federal courts for the
same reasons. Thus, in Harrison Halsted Community Group, Inc. v. Housing
and Home Finance Agency1O and Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency of the City
of Oakland," the courts avoided reaching the merits on the equal protection
claims by holding that the plaintiffs had no standing to sue. In Progress De-
velopment Corp. v. Alitchell,'2 plaintiffs charged the village with abusing the
power of eminent domain. It was alleged that the village had condemned the site
in question only because the developer had announced plans to sell plots to Ne-
groes. The 7th Circuit held that this complaint presented a justiciable issue and
ordered a trial on the merits to determine if the taking was done for a public pur-
pose or was done intentionally to deprive the plaintiffs of their rights. But sub-
sequent decisions confined the ruling in Progress to its facts. In Green Street As-
sociation v. Daleyl3 the equal protection issue was raised but was not decided. There
plaintiffs claimed that an urban renewal project was undertaken in order to create a
no-Negro "buffer zone" between a residential area and shopping area. The court
held that cases presenting challenges to urban renewal programs were matters for
5 See discussion, note 3, supra.
6Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency, 317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 375 U.S. 915
(1963); Green Street Association v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 387 U.S. 932
(1967); Harrison-Halsted Community Group, Inc. v. Housing and Home Finance Agency, 310
F.2d 99 (7th Cir.), cert, denied 373 U.S. 914 (1963). For complete discussion see Note, 77
YALE L.J. 966 (1968).
7 395 F.2d at 932-36.
8 See, Note, 77 YAE L.J. 966 (1968).
9 Green Street Association v. Daley, 373 F.2d 1, 6-7 (7th Cir. 1967); Norwalk CORE v.
Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 926-28 (2d Cir. 1968).
10 310 F.2d 99 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 373 U.S. 914 (1963).
11317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 375 U.S. 915 (1963).
12 286 F.2d 222 (7th Cir., 1961).
13 373 F.2d 1 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 387 U.S. 932 (1967).
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condemnation proceedings in state courts. In dicta, the court expressed concern
about the justiciability of the equal protection claim and indicated that it would not
inquire into the issue even if such were properly before it.' 4 The Green Street court
distinguished Progress by finding that the complaint before it did not challenge
the use of the power of eminent domain as a tool for discrimination, but only the
defendants' motives for fashioning the plan. Plaintiffs objected to the manner in
which the power was used, as manifested in various details of the plan. The
court felt this aspect of the urban renewal plan was beyond judicial inquiry.
At about the same time Green Street was being decided, an Illinois District
Court held a challenge to site selection policies of the Chicago Housing Authority
to be justiciable. In Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority15 plaintiffs al-
leged that sites for public housing projects were selected for the purpose of
maintaining existing patterns of discrimination. The court entertained only those
counts which alleged deliberate intent to deprive plaintiffs of 14th amendment
rights.
Unlike Green Street and Gautreaux, the Court in Norwalk was not faced with
a challenge to the basic validity of an urban renewal plan. The Court was asked
to hear a complaint which challenged only the proposed implementation of the
relocation aspect of the program. To determine that such an issue was justiciable,
the Court had to consider whether or not judicial inquiry would encroach on the
legislative domain.16 It acknowledged that its holding would affect the pace of
relocation and hence the priority of goals in urban renewal planning. Nonetheless
it felt that the relocation standard was set by the legislature. The adequacy of
that standard was a political question into which the court could not inquire. The
court could require only that the standard be met equally for all displacees. If
this requirement resulted in delaying the program, the delay - . . . would be due
to the standard, rather than its equal implementation for all."'1  Thus the court
dealt with one barrier to a finding of justiciability.
Another barrier to holding plaintiffs' claim justiciable was not as adequately
dealt with. In order to be considered justiciable, an issue must also be amenable
to traditional judicial remedies.18 Initially, the Norwalk court found that consid-
eration of applicable remedies was inappropriate since the case was only at the
pleading stage.'9 Thus, much of what is said in the decision about remedies must
be considered dicta. However, should the allegations of the complaint be proven
on remand, the District Court will face for the first time the problem of court
4Id. at 5.
Is 265 F.Supp. 582 (N.D. II. 1967).
16Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 196-68 (1962). In defining justiciability, the court's in-
quiry should proceed to the point of deciding whether the duty asserted can be judicially molded.
The "mere fact that the suit seeks protection of a political right does not mean it presents a po-
litical question," Id. at 209. Moreover, the Supreme Court stated:
Appellants claim that they are being denied equal protection is justiciable and if dis-
crimination is sufficiently shown, the right to relief under the equal protection clause
is not diminished by the fact that the discrimination relates to political rights. Id. at
209-10.
The Court explained that an issue is non-justiciable if the court finds: (1) A demonstrable
constitutional commitment to a coordinate political department. (2) Lack of judicially discov-
erable and manageable standards for resolving the problem. (3) The necessity of making an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion, 369 U.S. at 217.
17 395 F.2d at 930.
18 See, discussion note 16, supra.
19 395 F.2d at 929.
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fashioned remedies in this area. The dicta in Norwalk, then, assumes great im-
portance both for what it did and did not say.
The Court began its review by stating that if the plaintiffs' allegations are
proven, then
... the most appropriate form of judicial relief ... would be to require
proof that the relocation standard is being met in general as adequately for
non-whites as it is for whites before allowing the project to go forward.
An affirmative form of relief, such as an order requiring the construction
of low-income housing, would of course be much less appropriate, since it
would necessarily involve the court in areas foreign to its ex'perience and
competence.20
The Court further stated the following:
We do not understand plaintiffs' constitutional argument to be that de-
fendants must end discrimination in the Norwalk open housing market
through the relocation plan, or even that defendants must find integrated
housing for those displaced by the Project. Those are arguments we need
not consider until they are appropriately put to us.2 1
The suggestion seems to be that the District Court can fashion a remedy which
will meet the plaintiffs' equal protection claim without insisting on integrated
housing for plaintiffs or requiring defendants to end discrimination in the Nor-
walk Housing market. The Court suggests that the remedy would be adequate
if it required the standard to be met as adequately for non-whites as it is for
whites. It is the contention of this writer that given a factual situation similar to
that outlined in the Norwalk complaint, a court order requiring the relocation to
be accomplished as adequately for non-whites as it is for whites without a showing
that integrated housing is being provided for the displacees would be a violation
of the equal protection clause. It would seem that relocation of displacees into
housing which conforms to existing discriminatory patterns would be state rein-
forcement of discrimination. Acknowledgement, reinforcement, or encouragement
of such discrimination by an L.P.A. through its relocation efforts appears to violate
the 14th Amendment.
This contention was urged in Green Street Association v. Daley.2 2 The plain-
tiffs asserted that they had standing to raise the claim against HUD and the
local defendants by virtue of Section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 196423 The
Court held that the issue could not be asserted against the federal defendants
since plaintiffs had not exhausted administrative remedies provided by Section
602 and 603 of the Act.24 In dismissing the local defendants, 2 5 the court held
that the L.P.A.s could not have a duty to end existing segregated housing patterns
201d. at 929-30.
21 Id. at 930.
22 373 F.2d I (7th Cir.) cert. denied 387 U.S. 932 (1967).
2342 U.S.C. § 2000(d) which provides:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrim-
ination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
24 373 F.2d at 8-9. Plaintiffs might also have asserted standing under 42 U.S.C. 1983. In
both Norwalk, 395 F.2d at 926 and Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 265 F.Supp. 582
(N.D.Ill., 1967) the claim of standing to sue federal defendants was upheld under this section.
-
2 Standing to assert claims against local defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) is based on
the interpretation given the section in Bossier Parish School Board v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th
Cir. 1967).
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which were "accidental" to the relocation plan.28 A similar fate met the argument
in Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority.2 7 Plaintiffs were contesting L.P.A.
site selection practices. In dismissing counts which did not allege intentional
violation of the equal protection clause the court refused to condemn a housing
program "even though it may not affirmatively achieve alterations in existing pat-
terns of racial concentration in housing .... A showing of affirmative discrimina-
tory state action is required." 2 s
Thus, in the two cases which have considered the question, similar conclusions
were reached. The courts will not rule on alleged equal protection violations in
the relocation of displacees along existing segregated housing patterns unless there
is a showing of affirmative state action which created the patterns or unless an
intention to violate the equal protection mandate by the L.P.A. is demonstrated.
These holdings seem to ignore Supreme Court prohibitions against state action
which reinforces discrimination 2 9  The Court in Reitman v. Mulkeyo did not
rely on a showing of previous affirmative state action creating discrimination to
hold that a state may not encourage discrimination. Nor in Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority31 was a showing of an intention to reinforce discrimination
necessary for a holding that such reinforcement violated the 14th Amendment.
L.P.A. relocation of displacees into segregated housing patterns would seem to be
state reinforcement of discrimination. It would seem that, under the doctrine of
Reitman v. Mulkey, such reinforcement violates the equal protection clause. A
holding that present relocation practices do in fact reinforce discrimination would
force the L.P.A.s to change their relocation methods. It is difficult to imagine any
alternatives to the present relocation practices which would not have the effect of
promoting integration. Given a factual situation (as alleged in Norwalk) of ram-
pant housing discrimination, the L.P.A. will have to find some method of housing
displacees in integrated facilities in order to avoid reinforcing the existing dis-
crimination. This housing might be found in areas which are already integrated.
Relocating displacees in already integrated areas would expand the development
of these areas without contributing to the existing pattern. Another alternative
would be to place white displacees on non-white areas and non-white displacees in
white areas. Again, this would promote integration. A third, more costly al-
ternative would be to build new housing for the displacees. In order to avoid
state action which segregates the races, the new housing would have to be inte-
grated.82 In other words, a court prohibition of L.P.A. reinforcement of existing
26 373 F.2d at 9.
27 265 F.Supp. 582 (N.D.I1l. 1967).
28 Id. at 584.
29 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Burton
v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1965).
30387 U.S. 369 (1967).
31365 U.S. 715 (1965).
32 Separate but equal facilities have been outlawed in every other area of public activity,
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (schools); Dawson v. Mayor of Baltimore,
220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir.) aff'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (public beaches and bath-
houses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir.) af! d per curiam, 350 U.S. 879 (1955)
(golf courses); New Orleans City Park Improvement Association v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54
(1958) (parks); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1965); Turner v.
Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1961) (restaurants); Gayle v. Alabama Service Commission, 352 U.S.
903 (1956) (busses); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (seating in courtrooms). De-
termination in these cases of the definition of "public" activity rested both on the functions or
kinds of services being offered and actual government involvement in the area. Under these
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discrimination could conceivably compel the L.P.A.s into taking a more positive
role in integrating the nearby areas through placement of displacees.
The conclusion that L.P.A.s may ultimately be required to take affirmative
action to end discriminatory housing patterns may be reached by another method
of reasoning. In Gautreaux and Green Street, the courts refused to act unless it
could be shown that housing discrimination was more than "accidental" to the
plan. They wanted proof that such had been caused by state action. Proof of
discriminatory state action in the housing field could be shown by evidence that
the courts in the State had once endorsed restrictive covenants, 33 or had adopted
zoning ordinances along racial lines.3 Direct state involvement in segregated
housing might also be demonstrated by statistics of the Public Housing Adminis-
tration. 35 But even if intentional discrimination by the state in the field of hous-
ing cannot be proven sufficiently, there can be little argument that state practices
in the building of public housing and in relocating urban renewal displacees have
reinforced and compounded the existing patterns.38 Thus any holding that there
was affirmative state action could trigger the type of remedies outline in the 1968
school de-segregation cases.37 These cases held that the freedom of choice plans
adopted by many school districts were ineffective remedies to the problem of
school segregation.
While the Supreme Court did not hold in precise terms that the state had a
positive duty to integrate, it did test those plans by noting how much integration had
been achieved3 8 The Court cited with approval United States v. Jefferson County
School Board,3 9 which expressly held that a school board had an affirmative duty
to integrate. Thus, once state action which reinforces discrimination in housing
has been shown, court requirements to end it should be analogous to the kind of
remedies ordered in the school cases i.e., a plan designed to promote integration
before the project may go forward.
If, in Norwalk, the district court does not adopt this reasoning and proceeds to
merely require that the relocation standard be met as adequately for non-whites as
for whites, a violation of the equal protection clause may occur. Given the short-
age of housing alleged in the complaint the L.P.A. would probably elect to build
housing for the Negro and Puerto Rican families. This alternative would seem-
ingly be analagous to providing "separate but equal" facilities which has been re-
jected in all other areas of public accommodation.4 0 To avoid such a result, the
Norwalk situation would require the construction of integrated housing or the re-
location of displacees in standard housing not yet integrated. A lengthy discourse
would be required to show how this might be done without state encroachment on
individual rights. As a consequence, only a few suggestions can be mentioned.
cases it would seem that public housing is "public" even though the governmental function per-
formed is performed by private developers.
3 3 Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
3 4 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
3 Of all existing projects in the Public Housing Administration (PHA) program, 1179
were all white, 1174 were all Negro and 675 were integrated, PULIc HOUSING ADMINISTRA-
TioN, TRENDs TowARD OPEN OccuPANcy, REP. No. 12 (1963).
3 6Luttrell, The Public Housing Administration and Discrimination in Federally Assisted
Low Rent Housing, 64 MIcH. LR. 871 (1965-6).
3 7 Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Monroe v. Board of Education, 391
U.S. 443; Raney v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 443 (1968).
3 8 Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 439-42 (1968).
39 372 E.2d 836, 869, aff'd en bane, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967).
40 See cases cited, note 32, supra.
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In Green Street the court said that "[t]he city admittedly could not require
relocation in any particular area; it may only determine what housing is available
in fact and offer whatever assistance it can in furnishing this information to dis-
placees. The local defendants may not be enjoined from proceeding with the
plan simply because the plan fails to include what the local defendants would
be powerless to enforce - "integrated' relocation." 4  Hence, L.P.A.s may not
insist that displacees move into a certain area under the present system. They
may not even insist that displacees relocate in §105(c) standard housing.42 How-
ever, when submitting applications for loan and capital grant contracts they must
show that adequate relocation facilities exist for displacees or will be built for them
in the area.4 8 The L.P.A.s are required to maintain relocation offices on the
urban renewal site to assist displacees in finding housing.4 They are also pro-
hibited from listing any landlord who discriminates. 45  Where resort to public
and private housing would be futile, due to existing shortages, the L.P.A.s are
obligated to provide housing for those displaced. Initially, L.P.A.s might avoid
the mistakes made in the past by choosing a site for projected housing which
would not lend itself to easy racial classification by prospective tenants.4 6 To
maintain a racial balance within the building(s) one of two methods might be
adopted. Benign quotas might be used. Racial classification has been held per-
missible when the purpose is to achieve equality and avoid unequal treatment.4 T
Faced with the reality that housing, initially integrated, often becomes a ghetto
for one race or another, a court may look favorably on a system of quotas. 48 An-
other method to insure the integration of new housing would be to require the
pooling of all applications for public housing in a central office. Applicants for
public housing would be assigned as vacancies occur. This would prevent the
problems encountered by local housing authorities under the present tenant choice
41 373 F.2d at 9.
4242 U.S.C. § 1455 (Supp. 1967). See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN RE-
NEWAL, URBAN RENEWAL HANDBOOK, RHA 7212.1 (1968).
43 42 U.S.C. § 1455 (c) (Supp. 1967).
44 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF URBAN RENEWAL, URBAN RENEWAL HANDBOOK, RHA 7212.1
(1968).
45 Id. at 4-5. 1 HOUSING AND HomE FINANCE AGENCY, URBAN RENEWAL MAUAL 4-2-2,
Exhibit C (1967).
46 See Luttrell, note 36, supra.
4 7 Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 392 F.2d 920, 931-32 (2d Cir.
1968). It is interesting to note that such classification already takes place. HUD requires LPA
bookkeeping of relocation to be kept separately for each racial group and requires units available
in the community to be listed according to "racial availability," DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING
AND URBAN RENEWAL, URBAN RENEWAL HANDBOOK, Ch. 2, RHA 7212.1. Under the HHFA
requirements, if the L.P.A.s find the project will result in a "substantial net reduction in the
supply of housing in the project area available to minority group families . . ." the project may
proceed only if:
(1) Standard housing replacing the loss is provided elsewhere in the community in
new or existing dwelling units not previously available to the minority group. DE-
PARTMNT OF HOUSING AND HOM FINANC E, 1 HOUSING RENEWAL MANUAL,
10-1 at 1.
Although the bookkeeping methods are open to some question as to the purpose for which they
have been used in the past (i.e., whether or not the determination of "racial availability"' of units
might not have resulted in a reinforcement of already existing patterns of discrimination) it is
dear from the HHFA requirements that positive action by the L.P.A.s to end the discrimination
has at least been contemplated by the Agency.
4s Por an interesting discussion of the constitutionality of benign quotas see Bittker, The
Case of the Checker-Board Ordinance, 71 YALE L.J. 1387 (1962).
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plans. Prospective tenants would no longer be able to choose projects according to
racial preference.4 9 Of course both these plans would require new HUD and
Public Housing Authority regulations. The statutory authority might be found by
new judicial interpretation of §601 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.5 0
Integration of housing might also be aided by rent subsidization plans.51
HUD has already begun to make strides under §101 of the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1965. The progress made in this program, however, is
necessarily slow due to the eligibility requirements of private sponsors, the limits
placed on tenant eligibility and site selection practices. 52 This program might
well be expanded by appropriate legislation. In addition, the Widnall Plan53
through which subsidies are paid to landlords of existing housing might be used
effectively.54 "Vest Pocket" housing programs which envision scattered location
of small units in a neighborhood formerly not integrated, creating a racial mix
rather than racial concentration, might be tried.
It has often been said that the necessity of experimentation on such a difficult
social problem precludes court enforcement because of the fear that executive dis-
cretion will be stifled. The school desegregation cases and the history of court
enforcement since Brown v. Board of Education should dispel this notion.f5 Ex-
perience with reapportionment cases also shows the flexibility of judicial remedies.5 6
It has also been asserted that the government is powerless to prevent whites from
fleeing their neighborhoods to escape integration. However, it is believed that
integrated government housing programs which are attractive in terms of facilities
and financial benefits may counteract this tendency.
In summary, the fear of lack of enforceable standards should not dissuade
courts from requiring L.P.A.s to cease reinforcing existing patterns of discrimina-
tion. Court enforcement may be confined, as in the school desegregation cases,
to approval of plans according to their effects in achieving integration. It would
be premature to rule that local and federal agencies are incapable of working out
a plan which will promote housing integration.
Freda F. Bein
40 See Luttrell, note 36, supra.
60 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (Supp. 1967).
GI Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, § 101, 12 U.S.C. § 1701s (Supp. I, 1965);
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § 23, 42 U.S.C. § 1421 (b) (Supp. I, 1965).
52 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § 101 (b) (c) (f), 12 U.S.C. § 1701s
(b) (c) (f).
53 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 § 23, 42 U.S.C. § 1421 (b) (Supp. I,
1965).
B4 For a good discussion of provisions of rent subsidization programs and their effectiveness
in achieving integration, see Ellickson, Government Housing Assistance to the Poor, 76 YALE
LJ. (1966-7).
55 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). United States v. Jefferson County
Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836, afld en banc, 380 F. 2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967). See footnote
3S.
GG Every district court since Douglas' suggestion in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 250 n. 5
(1962) has, when confronted with the problem allowed the legislature some time to handle the
problem of reapportionment itself. See, e.g., Davis v. Cameron, 238 F. Supp. 462 (S.D. Iowa,
1965); Petusky v. Clyde 234 F. Supp. 960 (D.Utah, 1964). See Comment, 13 U.C.L.A. L
REv. 1345 (1965-6).
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